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NEPA'S IMPACT STATEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: A CASE STUDY 
OF NRDC V. MORTON! 
By Joan Ann Lukey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 
19692 (hereinafter NEPA) has significantly increased the amount 
of environmental litigation in Federal courts. When NEPA was 
enacted, however, most experts did not anticipate the scope of the 
forum that has resulted.3 
One of the reasons this result was unanticipated is the absence 
of any mention of judicial review in the procedural portion of the 
Act;4 furthermore, there is no indication in the legislative history 
that Congress intended the Federal courts to review agency com-
pliance with the new procedures.5 NEPA, therefore, has been 
an unexpected-and possibly unintended-aid to environmental 
groups. 
An initial determination has been made, however, that judicial 
review will be limited primarily to the procedural portions of Sec-
tion 43326 (a restriction which will be discussed below); and, con-
sequently, courts have been left with only one means of enforcing 
the policy7 proclaimed by NEPA, namely, the impact statement.8 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton (hereinafter 
NRDC v. Morton) demonstrates the application of NEPA's pro-
cedural requirement compelling agency consideration of the full 
range of available alternatives to a proposed Federal project, a re-
quirement that arguably requires agencies to consider substantive 
rather than merely procedural matters. It is clear from this decision, 
however, that the effectiveness of NEPA in requiring full consid-
eration of substantive environmental concerns has been limited by 
earlier judicial interpretations. The need to take further steps to 
ensure a continued effective forum for environmental groups may 
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be fulfilled by a judicial reassessment of the role of the courts or 
through a legislative expansion of the Act. 
This article will discuss first the legislative construction of NEP A 
and the initial restrictions on the scope of judicial review instituted 
by the Federal courts. The second section will discuss NRDC v. 
Morton and its relation to other NEPA cases. The third and final 
section will make recommendations for providing an effective 
forum for full judicial review of substantive matters under NEP A. 
II. THE STATUTE 
A. Legislative Construction9 
Subchapter I of NEP A contains a general statement of national 
environmental policy which the Federal government is to achieve 
in cooperation with state and local governments and "other con-
cerned public and private organizations." Section 4331 (b)lO sets 
forth the national goals of environmental policy as specified in the 
Senate billY More significant is the prefacing remark that it is "the 
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy" to help achieve the enumerated goals. Section 
4331(c) is critical, at least as much for what it does not say as for 
what it does, stating that "[t]he Congress recognizes that each per-
son should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has 
a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement 
of the environment." This language is a conference substitute for 
the Senate version which stated that the Congress recognizes that 
"each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful 
environment." The compromise language was adopted because of 
doubts of the House conferees concerning the legal scope of the 
original Senate wording.12 The significance of this change will be 
discussed later. 
The most important section of the Act for consideration here is 
Section 4332, which has been designated by the courts as the "pro-
cedural" portion13 of the Act. The procedures set out for imple-
menting NEPA's stated policy are to be followed "to the fullest 
extent possible." The purpose of this language is to ensure that "no 
[Federal] agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of 
its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance."14 Among 
the enumerated procedures is a requirement that a detailed state-
ment (i.e. the impact statement) by the responsible official be in-
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cluded in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
environment. The impact statement shall include: 
... the environmental effects which can not be avoided should the 
proposal be adopted, alternatives to the proposed action, the rela-
tionship between the short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any 
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would 
be involved.15 
Most litiL'ation to date involving NEPA has concellled whether 
the impact statement is required at all for a particular project, or 
whether the finished impact statement is adequate and has been 
developed and circulated properly. 
The remainder of Subchapter I (Sections 4333, 4334, and 4335) 
concerns the effect of NEPA on existing law. In essence, these sec-
tions make the policies and goals of the Act supplementary to 
existing authorizations. While the Act does not repeal existing 
law, agencies are required to comply with NEP A unless compliance 
would violate any existing statutory authorizations.16 
B. Judicial Interpretation 
In a previous case decided under NEP A, Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Corps of Engineers of the United States ArmyI7 (herein-
after EDF v. Corps), conservation groups sought injunctive relief 
against work on the Gilham Dam project. The court concluded: 
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. 
The Congress, by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the 
then existing decisionmaking responsibilities or to take away any 
then existing freedom of decisionmaking, but it certainly intended 
to make such decisionmaking more responsive and more responsible.ls 
Little else seems certain except that Congress wished to express a 
national policy in favor of protecting the environment.19 Nowhere 
is it mentioned who is assigned the task of enforcing this general 
policy.20 Furthermore, judicial review is not mentioned, a fact of 
particular interest to this article. 
The lack of this latter provision is not unusual,21 but, coupled 
with the legislative history of the Act,22 courts have been reluctant 
to deal with the issue of judicial review. Although some sources 
suggest that the lack of specific limitations has given the courts 
arbitrary powers,23 the case law is quite to the contrary. 
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Federal courts have interpreted the statute as limiting their 
powers of review largely to matters arising under Section 4332,24 
the procedural portion of the Act. The Court in EDF v. Corps rea-
soned that, since the compromised version of NEP A falls short of 
vesting substantive rights iri anyone, substantive administrative 
decisions could be reversed "only if they were not made in the 
manner required by law or if they were arbitrary and capricious 
under constitutional standards."25 These limitations were followed 
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC26 (herein-
after Calvert Cliffs'), in which the Atomic Energy Commission was 
enjoined from continuing work on a nuclear power plant project 
because the AEC's procedural requirements for hearings and li~ 
censing did not comply with NEP A. Each of the four parts of the 
AEC decision-making regulations in question in some way limited 
full consideration and separate balancing of environmental values. 
The Court differentiated between Section 4331, which sets forth 
the Act's basic substantive policy, and Section 4332, which enumer-
ates procedural provisions designed to insure that Federal agencies 
implement that policy.27 While the substantive duties of Section 
4331(b) are discretionary, since agencies are required to "use all 
practicable means consistent with other essential considerations," 
the procedural duties of Section 4332 must be fulfilled to the "full-
est extent possible." The court interpreted the latter phrase as 
establishing a strict standard of compliance,28 subject to judicial 
review to ascertain whether the standard has been met. However, 
the Court did qualify the substantive/procedural dichotomy by 
stating that, although a substantive policy determination was be-
yond its scope, a reviewing court could reverse a substantive deci-
sion on its merits under Section 4331, if "it be shown that the 
actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary 
or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values."29 In 
other words, the Court applied a traditional administrative law 
rule that an agency decision may be reversed on the merits only 
when the agency has abused its discretion. In addition, the Court 
stated that compliance with procedural duties to the "fullest" pos-
sible extent would seem to require that environmental issues be 
considered at every important stage in the decisionmaking process.30 
Although EDF v. Corps and Calvert Cliffs' emphasize procedural 
review, substantive review in a limited sense to a limited extent is 
also available: the decision as to whether or not NEPA applies to a 
particular Government project is reviewable by the courts. The 
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NEPA language "major federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment," has generally been broadly in-
terpreted by the courts as requiring impact statements for such 
diverse projects as a proposed Federal jail,31 a dam and reservoir 
project,32 highway construction33 and renovation,34 and a 2.5 per-
cent surcharge on all rail freight, because that surcharge increased 
the shipping costs of recyclable materials.35 Regardless of how 
broadly the courts apply this aspect of substantive review power, 
litigation in this area will more than likely decrease as certain 
routine Federal activities-highway construction, for example36-
are designated by the courts as falling within NEP A. NEPA, there-
fore, has been instrumental in forcing Federal agencies to establish 
procedures to consider carefully in a timely fashion the environ-
mental consequences of their activities. 
The second and more emphasized area of effectiveness of the 
Federal courts under NEPA has been that of procedural review. 
The courts have reviewed Government compliance with Section 
4332,37 and hence will decide whether an agency has produced a 
procedurally acceptable impact statement. Calvert Cliffs' indicates 
that the review shall be limited to whether or not an agency has 
made a good faith effort to comply with the procedural require-
ments of the section, irrespective of the agency's substantive re-
marks or conclusions. Obviously, substance and procedure are not 
easily differentiated, which gives the courts some flexibility even 
within the Calvert Cliffs' restrictions.3s 
But, in spite of the success of the impact statement in providing 
a Federal forum, its effectiveness remains limited. If the courts 
continue to limit their review to whether an impact statement 
meets the procedural requirements of the Act, it is inevitable that 
agencies will master the necessary techniques, with no assurance 
that substantive matters will be fully examined.39 
III. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: NRDC v. MORTON 
A. Background 
On October 28, 1971, the Department of the Interior filed its 
"Final Environmental Impact Statement"40 for its proposal for a 
lease sale of eighty tracts of submerged lands, primarily off eastern 
LouisianaY A motion to enjoin this sale was made by plaintiffs42 
on November 1, 1971 prior to the opening of bids on the almost 
380,000 acres which was scheduled for December 21, 1971. On 
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December 16, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction, and granted the motion on a finding that the Depart-
ment had not complied with NEP A. On December 20, just one day 
before the scheduled sale, a hearing in which the Government 
sought termination of the injunction before the Court of Appeals 
resulted in an order permitting bids to be received on condition 
that they remain unopened pending further order of that court. On 
January 13, 1972, the Court of Appeals denied the Government's 
motion for summary reversal of the injunction order, on the 
grounds that the impact statement did not contain sufficient dis-
cussion of alternatives to the proposed sale. On remand, the District 
Court held that the Department still had not complied with Section 
4332(2)(C) of NEP A because the amended statement had not been 
submitted to any other Federal agencies for review, nor had the 
views of appropriate agencies been solicited. 
There was no dispute concerning the conservation groups' stand-
ing,43 nor as to the appropriateness of the equitable remedy they 
sought.44 The issues in dispute concerned only the Government's 
impact statement. 
B. Analysis 
It is evident that the sale of oil lease rights should be character-
ized as a "major federal action" and hence should fall within the 
scope of the NEPA impact statement requirement.45 The dispute 
in NRDC v. Morton was not whether an impact statement was nec-
essary, but, rather, whether the statement produced by the Gov-
ernment had been properly prepared within the wording of the Act. 
The Court of Appeals decision denying the Government's sum-
mary reversal motion was predicated on the Government's failure 
to discuss adequately alternatives to their lease sale proposal. The 
"pertinent instruction of Congress" was Section 4332(2)(C)(iii) and 
Section 4332(2)(D), both of which deal with the responsibilities of 
Federal agencies in regard to alternatives. 
Section 4332(2)(C)(iii) requires that alternatives must be in-
cluded in the impact statement, while Section 4332(2)(D) calls for 
a study of "appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of 
action ip any proposal which involves unreasonable conflicts." The 
agency is also called upon to "describe" those "appropriate alterna-
tives," but the statute isn't clear as to who is to receive the descrip-
tion. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the impact 
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statement is "the proper instrument to provide this focus,"46 pur-
suant to guidelines promulgated by the Council on Environmental 
QualityY The Court therefore combined the requirements of Sec-
tions 4332(2)(C) and (D) to compel a detailed statement that in-
cluded, not only a statement of the alternatives, but also a study and 
description of these alternatives. The Court stated that a sound 
construction of NEPA also required a presentation of the environ-
mental risks incident to "reasonable alternative courses of action."48 
Up to this point, the Court of Appeals opinion was in keeping with 
the Calvert Cliffs' substantive/procedural dichotomy and a har-
monious conclusion was reached.49 
NRDC v. Morton, however, goes on to deal with substantive 
considerations, while striving to remain within a procedural frame-
work. For example, the Court held that Interior's Impact Statement 
was in error in declaring that one of the possible alternatives, the 
elimination of oil import quotas, was entirely outside its cogni-
zance.50 The Impact Statement should have presented the environ-
mental effects of that alternative, regardless of whether or not 
Interior had the power to adopt it, since Interior has the duty to 
discuss all "reasonably available"51 alternatives. The Court rea-
soned that, since Congress and the President are to take guidance 
from the Impact Statement,52 they should be informed by Interior 
of the environmental effects53 of that alternative. This result was 
accomplished, first, by categorizing oil imports as a "reasonably 
available" alternative; second, by inferring that the ultimate de-
cisionmakers might have need of such information; and, third, by 
limiting the required information to environmental effects. 
There was evidence of further substantive considerations in 
NRDC v. Morton: 
We are aware that the 1953 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act con-
tains a finding of an urgent need for OCS development and authoriza-
tion of leasing. Similarly we are aware that the oil import quota 
program was instituted by the President on a mandatory basis in 
1959, following earlier voluntary programs ... As to both programs 
Congress contemplated continuing review.54 
The tone of the opinion seems to indicate that the Court would have 
liked to order, were it within its power, the "contemplated con-
tinuing review" by the other two branches. 
It should be noted that the above examples of treatment of 
substantive issues were only dicta. Interior is thus required to dis-
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cuss the alternatives which the Court deemed necessary, but it is 
in no way bound to implement, or even to recommend, the alterna-
tives. The holding can be summarized by seven guidelines concern-
ing the scope of the alternative provision(s) to be included in the 
impact statement: 
1. All "reasonably available" alternatives must be discussed, whether 
or not the reporting agency or official can effectuate them.55 
2. The statement must set forth the required material in a form 
suitable for the enlightenment of the others concerned, and must 
not be dependent upon implication or subsequent justification by 
counse1.56 
3. Past determinations by Congress or the President do not eliminate 
the need for continuing review. 57 
4. The discussion of environmental effects of alternatives need not 
be exhaustive; rather, it should be sufficient to permit "a reasoned 
choice of alternatives."58 When these effects cannot be readily ascer-
tained and the alternatives are deemed only remote and speculative 
possibilities, detailed discussion is not required. 59 
5. When alternatives are not within the scope of authority of the 
responsible official, reference may be made to studies of other 
agencies, including other impact statements.60 
6. Alternatives should not be disregarded simply because they do 
not offer a complete solution to the problem.61 
7. The necessity of legislative implementation does not automati-
cally place an alternative beyond NEPA's scope.62 
These seven procedural guidelines are intermingled with the 
substantive matter in the court's opinion. The court characterizes 
these guidelines as "a construction of reasonableness."63 As a con-
sequence of this decision a court will not actively interject itself 
within the area of executive discretion, as long as NEPA's proce-
dural requirements are followed reasonably and in good faith. 64 It 
is submitted that the Court of Appeals fell just short of overstep-
ping its own guidelines contained in Calvert Cliffs', because it spoke 
to the substantive issues of the merits of certain alternatives. Cir-
cuit Judge MacKinnon's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, concluded that the majority had in fact overstepped its 
limitations, though for other reasons. It was not the discussion of 
alternatives on their merits which disturbed him,65 but rather the 
narrowness of the procedural guidelines which had been enumer-
ated.66 
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Two weeks after the Court of Appeals denied the Government's 
motion for summary reversal of the preliminary injunction, In-
terior returned to District Court with an addendum to its impact 
statement. This time the District Court concluded that Section 
4332(2)(C) still had not been complied with, because the addendum, 
which the court categorized as a draft statement,67 had not been 
properly circulated among the agencies, nor had the comments and 
views of "the appropriate Federal, state, and local agencies" been 
solicited.68 The District Court followed Calvert Cliffs' and found 
that impact statements must accompany proposals through the 
whole agency review process.69 The reasoning behind this decision 
was that "compliance to the 'fullest' possible extent would seem to 
demand that environmental issues be considered at every important 
stage in the decision making process ... "70 To read the word "ac-
company" more narrowly would make the impact statement a mere 
formality, which was not the intent of Congress. However, in view 
of the fact that the motion to dissolve had been withdrawn and that 
an addendum had been prepared, although not yet circulated, the 
Court concluded that the case was moot. 
NRDC v. Morton demonstrates the effectiveness of the impact 
statement in the courts. However, the submission and rejection of 
impact statements is a finite process; once the Government masters 
the procedural technicalities, the environmentalists may find them-
selves without a judicial remedy. 
C. Other NEPA Cases 
Calvert Cliffs' is among the most important precedents for judi-
cial interpretation of NEPA, and NRDC v. Morton was the first 
opportunity for the Calvert Cliffs' Court to apply its own guidelines 
from that case.71 As is suggested above, even in the first instance of 
application on the merits, the Court seemed to be straining against 
the narrow guidelines they had set for themselves. 
An interim case in the D.C. Circuit, Committee for Nuclear Re-
sponsibility v. Seaborg72 (hereinafter Seaborg), shows even greater 
frustration. The plaintiffs in Seaborg were conservation groups 
seeking to enjoin an underground nuclear explosion on Amchitka 
Island, Alaska. The District Court found, inter alia, that the AEC's 
impact statement satisfied all requirements of NEPA, and, based 
on their limited powers of review under Calvert C [iffs', denied plain-
tiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the order, but on other grounds entirely: 
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Our failure to enjoin the test is not predicated on a conviction 
that the AEC has complied with NEP A in setting forth the dangers 
of environmental harm.73 The NEP A process-which is designed to 
minimize the likelihood of harm-has not run its course in the courts. 
While the Government's assertion of monetary damage from the 
injunction is not minimal, it does not weigh as heavily with us as 
its assertions of potential harm to national security and foreign pol-
icy-assertions which we obviously cannot appraise-and given the 
meager state of the record before us, we are constrained to refuse an 
injunction.74 
Thus, the court refrained from applying even its limited proce-
dural powers, in spite of the fact that the AEC had failed to disclose 
several adverse reports from other Federal agencies. 75 This is not 
a further restriction of the Court's power of review under NEP A. 
Rather, the Court is applying the long-standing "emergency doc-
trine," arising from the Administrative Procedure Act. 76 Under 
this doctrine normal disclosure processes do not apply to matters 
that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret 
in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy."77 The ma-
jority of the Sea borg Court felt constrained to accept the Govern-
ment's contention that this nuclear test fell within the protected 
exception. The court admitted that it could not be sure that the test 
was not a matter of national security, and therefore the risk of an 
injunction could not be allowed. The Supreme Court in a memo-
randum decision without opinion denied appellants' application 
for an injunction in aid of jurisdiction.78 There was, however, a 
dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, who would have granted the 
injunction so that the case could be heard on the merits. Justice 
Douglas felt that the Calvert Cliffs' "good faith" requirement was 
applicable to the Seaborg case, and that the Supreme Court should 
go down on record in support of the D.C. Circuit Court's position 
in Calvert Cliffs'.79 
A few months after NRDC v. Morton, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia found itself facing another major NEPA case, 
Wilderness Society v. Morton. 80 This is the first of two cases which 
suggest that agencies may master the procedural technicalities and 
hasten the need for further legislative or judicial steps. Here, the 
Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Secretary of 
the Interior from proceeding with a trans-Alaska pipeline until the 
courts could determine whether there had been compliance with 
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NEPA prior to the issuance of either the impact statement or the 
order. At the same time, the Court denied an application for inter-
vention by a Canadian environmental group and a non-resident 
citizen. Because the impact statement had not yet been issued, the 
Court of Appeals addressed itself only to the latter point and 
reversed the denial of the application for intervention.81 Subse-
quently, Interior produced the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Environ-
mental Impact Statement and, together with Interior's proof of all 
necessary statutory authorization and permits, this led the District 
Court to conclude (somewhat reluctantly) that an injunction was 
precl uded. 82 
This conclusion was based solely on the fact that Interior's impact 
statement "reasonably sets forth ... " each of the requirements 
stipulated in Section 4332(C). The court noted that "It can be con-
fidently anticipated that the final decision in this matter rests with 
the Supreme Court of the United States."83 But at the first level, at 
least, the Government appears to have mastered the procedural re-
quirements enumerated in Calvert Cliffs' and NRDC v. Morton. 
The second case which possibly reduces the impact statement's 
effectiveness as an environmentalist's tool is Conservation Council 
of North Carolina v. Froehlke84 (hereinafter Froehlke). This case 
was decided two weeks after the final NRDC v. Morton District 
Court decision, yet the opinion makes no mention even of the 
earlier D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision. The plaintiffs in 
Froehlke were seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in connec-
tion with the construction of a dam by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers, but the impact statement prepared by the Corps was three 
volumes long.85 Although the court sought for a determinative pro-
cedural error, they were unable to find one in the Government's 
lengthy work-product. The judges refused to refine the substantive / 
procedural restrictions86 or to treat the Army's actions as an abuse 
of discretion. Even though the plaintiffs had presented evidence 
casting doubt on the advisability of the project, since they did not 
show that defendants had failed to comply with NEP A, the 
Froehlke Court concluded that they were unlikely to succeed in 
final determination of the matter. The motion for preliminary 
injunction was therefore denied. 
This case is not in accord with NRDC v. Morton, and the 
Froehlke Court is almost surely the one in error. Of the Corps' 
three volume statement, only seven pages were devoted to discus-
sion of alternatives, and this included no discussion at all of the 
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environmental effects of those alternatives. In direct opposition to 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in NRDC v. Morton, the 
Froehlke Court determined that only the alternatives themselves 
need be included in the statement87 because the requirement that 
an agency "study, develop and describe alternatives"88 was not nec-
essarily part of the impact statement. There was no indication 
given that the Froehlke Court or the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit which later affirmed were aware of the earlier de-
cision to the contrary. 
Had the Froehlke Court followed NRDC v. Morton, the impact 
statement would have effectively delayed the Government project. 
The implication of this case is nevertheless critical. The Army pre-
pared a lengthy statement which contained only one apparent flaw. 
Since the ground rules have now basically been determined, any 
agency can produce a procedurally acceptable statement with the 
proper amount of time and effort. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
NEP A has been interpreted by the Federal courts as compelling 
government agencies to establish strict procedures for considering 
the environmental consequences of proposed actions. However, it 
is evident that there is now a need for judicial or legislative reform 
in order to ensure a continued, effective forum for the consideration 
of environmental issues. It is submitted that judicial review of 
agency compliance should not be limited to merely procedural mat-
ters. Among the possibilities for such reform are the following, 
which are not mutually exclusive: 
1. The Calvert Cliffs' substantive/procedural dichotomy could 
be re-examined and refined by the Supreme Court. The Calvert 
Cliffs' Court, in emphasizing the power of judicial review over the 
procedural portions of NEPA, recognized the traditional adminis-
trative law power to reverse or to vacate and remand if the agency 
conclusion was arbitrary or clearly not based on sufficient evi-
dence.89 But, it deemphasized this limited area of substantive review 
in order to emphasize the importance of procedural review. Later 
courts may, as a result, feel constrained from declaring that an 
agency has overstepped its substantive discretion. To the same end, 
Calvert Cliffs' distinguished too sharply between Sections 4331 and 
4332. The fact that a reviewing court cannot substitute its substan-
tive conclusions for those of an agency does not mean that the court 
must limits its review to procedural technicalities. If an agency 
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abuses its discretion under a statute, the reviewing court, as noted 
in Calvert Cliffs', has a duty to halt the offensive activity. The Cal-
vert Cliffs' Court obviously did not mean to imply that this was not 
so, but the over-emphasis on Section 4332 might tend to give that 
. . ImpreSSIOn. 
2. The Supreme Court could find that the Constitution, as it 
now exists, gives every individual a fundamental right to a health-
ful, enjoyable environment. If such a right were to exist, environ-
mental considerations would weigh more heavily in the cost-benefit 
analysis required by NEPA,90 as compared, for example, to in-
creased Government expense or time delays. The standard which 
the courts would apply in regard to agency abuse of discretion 
would also undoubtedly be more stringent. This approach was at-
tempted by the plaintiffs in EDF v. Corps,91 who contended that 
"the right to enjoy the beauty of God's creation and to live in an 
environment that preserves the unqualified amenities of life"92 was 
part of the liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and was also one of those unenumerated rights retained by 
the people under the Ninth Amendment. While the EDF v. Corps 
Court rejected this line of reasoning within the present state of the 
law, it agreed that such claims might eventually obtain judicial 
recognition even without altering the Constitution. 
3. The same result could be achieved with greater speed if Con-
gress re-evaluated and amended NEP A to make a healthful, har-
monious environment a fundamental right of every individual. 
This would create the same considerations and stricter standards 
discussed above and, since the Senate has already passed the bill in 
this form once,93 it is not unreasonable to consider such an amend-
ment as a future possibility. This is probably the most effective of 
the alternatives that can be reasonably foreseen in the near future. 
4. Finally, there is the alternative of enacting a Constitutional 
amendment making a healthful, harmonious environment a funda-
mental right. To the extent that NEPA then infringed on the 
courts' attempts to enforce that right, the Act would be preempted 
by the Constitution. The courts would, theoretically at least, have 
power to review the activities undertaken by an agency to deter-
mine whether or not such activities violated the individual's right. 
Within the framework of current Constitutional interpretation, if 
such a violation were found, the Government would probably have 
to prove some type of compelling interest in the proposed activity. 
In practice, this would be similar to the current cost-benefit anal-
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ysis, but with the scales tipped initially much more in favor of the 
individual or environmental group. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To date, NEPA has provided an effective forum in the Federal 
courts for environmentalists. Besides giving conservation groups 
standing to bring suits, the Act as interpreted by the courts forces 
Government agencies to study and consider the effects of their ac-
tivities on the environment. The courts have the power of judicial 
review of Government compliance with NEP A at two stages: first, 
where challenged by an individual or organization with standing, 
the courts have made the substantive determination as to whether 
or not a particular project falls within the meaning of the Act; and 
second, the courts have determined whether the Federal agency has 
adequately fulfilled the procedural requirements of the Act. Most 
litigation in both areas has concerned the impact statement. N RDC 
v. Morton is an excellent example of the use of that procedural re-
quirement as an environmentalist's tool. 
While the Act was being interpreted by the courts, conservation-
ists were frequently able to delay and occasionally to prevent 
Government projects which they believed to be detrimental to the 
environment. Now that guidelines have been enumerated in the 
early NEP A cases, however, there is a great likelihood that agencies 
will master the procedural technicalities of the Act without incorpo-
rating the Act's underlying policy into agency projects. If the Fed-
eral courts are to remain an effective forum for environmental 
disputes, further substantive rights in a healthy and harmonious 
environment must be created by Congress, by the Supreme Court, 
or by Constitutional Amendment. 
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